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Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
Superficially, these words, which form an integral part of our Bill
of Rights, appear unequivocal and thus a questionable source of contro-
versy. Since its inception, however, this seemingly innocuous directive
has repeatedly been the focal point for impassioned arguments relative
to the separation of church and state."
Recently, there has been a proliferation of litigation applicable to
one specific area of church-state relations. Three years ago, the Supreme
Court upheld a New York statute requiring local public school author-
ities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades 7 through
12, including students attending private parochial schools.2 This year
the Court held unconstitutional state programs which called for a pur-
chase of services arrangements and teacher salary supplements4 to paro-
chial schools. Concurrently, the Court also upheld a federal program
which granted aid to church-related universities for the construction of
buildings and facilities to be used for secular educational purposes.5
* This article is a student work prepared by Thomas Klein, a member of the ST.
JOHN'S LAw REVIEW and St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 The term "separation clause" is a misnomer, since it is not mentioned in the
body of the Constitution. This expression merely refers to that portion of the first
amendment which denies to the federal government establishment of any religion
and further guarantees religious freedom.
2 Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), decided with Robinson v. DiCenso,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
4 Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
5 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). The court held however that the por-
tion of the program wherein the United States retains a 20 year interest in any
facility constructed with funds under the Act and if during this period, the recip-
ient violates the statutory conditions, the government is entitled to recovery of funds
is unconstitutional "as the unrestricted use of valuable property after 20 years is in
effect a contributism to a religious body." Id. at 683, 684.
This new eruption of litigation concern-
ing state aid to church-related schools has
thus rejuvenated interest in the debate over
the legality of such assistance. The present
financial crisis in the parochial school sys-
tem has also contributed immensely to this
topic once again assuming a paramount
position among contemporary problems.
Presumably, these current cases merely
foreshadow another sequence of cases in
the incessant controversy concerning the
extent to which the first amendment re-
quires a separation of church and state.
State aid to parochial schools6 is a topic
which by its nature elicits vehement opin-
ions from all concerned. 7 Since both pro-
ponents and opponents of "parochiaid"
tend to expound their convictions over-
zealously, their arguments are impeded by
a lack of one essential element-rationality.
Professor Paul Kauper has very aptly
stated in conjunction with this problem that
"[blasic predilections and prejudices enter
into a person's consideration of these ques-
tions and help shape his conceptions of
what is wise policy in their solution."' 8 In
attempting to restore rationality to the dis-
cussion of state aid to parochial schools,
6 Generally, the terms "parochial," "church-
related," and "nonpublic" are used interchange-
ably throughout this paper in reference to Roman
Catholic schools. This is based on the fact that
the vast majority of nonpublic schools are affili-
ated with the Roman Catholic church. For ex-
ample, in both Lemon and DiCenso, 95 percent
of nonpublic schools involved were under Roman
Catholic control.
7 See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, FREEDOM
521-26 (1967), [hereinafter L. PFEFFER], listing
various arguments for and against state aid to
nonpublic schools.
8 Kauper, Church, State and Freedom: A Re-
view, 52 MICH. L. REV. 829, 830 (1954).
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this article will enunciate and evaluate the
fundamental principles and policies upon
which the Supreme Court has relied in
adjudicating problems in this realm.
Historical Background of State Aid to
Parochial Schools
Before considering the Supreme Court's
disposition of state aid to parochial schools,
it is imperative that a brief exploration be
made into the evolution of education in
America. This inquiry will put in perspec-
tive the previous relationship between state
aid and the church.
Throughout the majority of states in the
colonial and early national periods, educa-
tion was the handmaiden of religion and
the use of public funds to support religion
was the conventional way of financing edu-
cation. The secularization of public schools
occurred in gradual stages over a period of
years and resulted in tax funds being rele-
gated to public schools only." This inevi-
tably precipitated the decline of religious
schools. Due to their religious tradition,
most people still desired some form
of religious instruction in the schools.
However, the multitude of religious sects
made it impractical to teach the common
tenets of all the beliefs.' 0 Therefore, the
public school curriculum was divorced from
any religious content.
9 An excellent treatment of the evolution of non-
public educational systems in New York and
Massachusetts is presented in the Petition of
Appellees for Rehearing and Supplemental Opin-
ion, Supplement A, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
10 By the close of the nineteenth century, Amer-
ica had 150 religious sects. Burrs, A CULTURAL
HISTORY OF EDUCATION 454 (1947).
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Although a few different sects main-
tained private schools, Protestant religious
education was confined mainly to the
church. Catholics, however, found the com-
promise intolerable, on the ground that
education without religion is incongruous.
As a politically negligible minority in most
states during the early 1800's, the Catholics
were forced to continue their own schools.
The 1830's signaled the commencement
of an enormous Catholic immigration which
continued until the end of the century and
resulted in the emergence of Catholics as
a political force. In 1840, this newly de-
veloped power found its expression in the
attempt to obtain public funds for Catholic
education in New York.11 The continuing
Catholic demands for public aid were met
with rigorous opposition which is best ex-
emplified by the formation of such groups
as the Know-Nothing party and the Native-
American party.12 By enacting amendments
to their constitutions which specifically pro-
hibited aid to nonpublic schools, the vast
majority of states mirrored this anti-Cath-
olic sentiment.13 In many instances, these
provisions expressed a more restrictive atti-
tude toward aid to church-related schools
than the federal Constitution itself.
Currently, there is developing a trend
toward the earlier mode of financing reli-
gious education through public funds. The
11 There were appropriations of state funds to
denominational schools in New York as late as
1871. See N.Y. SESS. LAWS ch. 869 (1871).
12 A good study of the Native-American move-
ment is found in R. A. BILLINGTON, THE PROT-
ESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860 (Quadrangle Books
ed. 1964).
13 See Note, Catholic Schools and Public Money,
50 YALE L.J. 917 (1941).
American disposition is far more benign to
the constitutionality of educational aid to
parochial schools than in the waning years
of the nineteenth century. In the last few
decades the emotions which prompted the
anti-aid amendments have been constantly
dwindling. Various theories have been ad-
vanced for the more auspicious American
attitude concerning aid to parochial schools.
Among the important factors contributing
to a relaxation of interreligious suspicion
has been the imposition of federal statutory
provisions regulating immigration. The
widespread ecumenical movement initiated
by the Vatican Councils of Pope John
XXIII and Pope Paul VI has also alleviated
to a great extent the mutual distrust of the
various sects. 14
The modification of the stringent require-
ments of the various state constitutions has
now reached the point where many states
are giving assistance in the form of text-
books,' 5 buses, 16 shared time,1 7 and schol-
arships' 8 to parochial school students.
Funds are now also provided on the federal
level for textbooks and other instructional
materials for those attending parochial
schools. 19 Higher education has received
liberal benefits in the form of grants and
14 Sutherland, Establishment of Religion 1968,
19 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 469, 476 (1968).
15 See, e.g., LA. REV. STATS. § 17:352 (1928);
MISS. CODE § 6656 (1940); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 701 (McKinney 1965).
16 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 18 A:39-1 (1968);
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3635 (McKinney 1951).
17 L. PFEFFER, supra note 7, 571-78.
18 See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 601, 601(a)
(McKinney 1968).
19 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, 20 U.S.C. § 201 (1965).
loans for the construction of both public
and private schools. 20
Restrictions on Scope of Religion Clauses
Another point which merits considera-
tion concerns the degree to which the first
amendment demands separation of church
and state in the area of education. The
language of the two religion clauses does
not easily facilitate analysis on this point.
However, in an attempt to clarify the mean-
ing of the first amendment religious clauses,
two extremes have been posited by the au-
thorities. One extreme position contends
that the first amendment requires aid to
nonpublic schools. 21 The other extreme
would deny all aid to nonpublic schools on
the theory that the establishment clause
must be strictly construed as forbidding aid,
either directly or indirectly, to religion.22
In this writer's opinion, both extremes are
incorrect. There is a certain area wherein
state aid to education is permitted, that area
being aid for the secular aspects of educa-
tion.
To illustrate that absolute principles in
constitutional law are dangerous, 23 an in-
vestigation of the strict constructionist
viewpoint of aid will be undertaken. Ad-
20 Higher Education Facilities Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 701 et seq. (1963).
21 See, e.g., P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW
112 (1962).
22 See L. PFEFFER 535.
23 This danger is best illustrated in the following
statement: "The taking of extreme positions leads
too often to what can ill afford to endure when
its task is too difficult at its best." Griswold, Ab-
solute is in the Dark--a Discussion of the Ap-
proach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional
Question, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 181 (1963).
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vocates of the absolutist viewpoint of sep-
aration of church and state attribute their
authoritativeness to two prime sources. The
first is James Madison's Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments
of 178524 which has frequently been rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court as an im-
portant guide for ascertaining the impact
of the first amendment. 25 This work was
written in opposition to a proposal which
was pending in the Virginia Assembly to
levy a tax for the benefit of "teachers of
the Christian religion." As a synopsis of
Madison's refutation of the proposition, the
essence of the Remonstrance is expressed
in the following passage:
Who does not see that the same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclu-
sion of all other Religions, may establish
with the same ease any particular sect of
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?
That the same authority which can force
a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of any one
establishment, may force him to conform
to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever? 26
These words and indeed the entire Remon-
strance will not stand up to the broad inter-
pretations that a complete separation of
church and state is compulsory. On the
contrary, these very words show that Madi-
son's conception of an "establishment of
religion" was a religion enjoying a preferred
status. The Remonstrance was a rebuttal
to a law which directed tax receipts solely
24 11 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183-191
(Hunt ed. 1901).
25 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 37 (1946) (Rutledge, J. dissenting).
26 II THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 186.
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to the support of a favored religion. Today
this type of preferential law would also be
struck down as being violative of the first
amendment restrictions.
Furthermore, supporters of the abso-
lutist persuasion emphasize the fact that
Madison introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives the original proposal leading
to the first amendment. It read:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged
on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be estab-
lished, nor shall the full and equal rights
of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed.27
A controversy developed over whether the
word "national" should be incorporated in
the amendment. During this debate, the
intentions of Madison were further revealed
as this pertinent extract from the Annals
of Congress indicates:
Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the
meaning of the words to be, that Congress
should not establish a religion, and enforce
the legal observation of it by law, nor com-
pel men to worship God in any manner
contrary to their conscience. 28
Although a number of Representatives
understood Madison's concept of the im-
plications involved in the first amendment,
they felt that others might misconstrue the
words to the detriment of religion. Once
again, Madison reiterated his opinion that
the scope of the first amendment is limited
to insuring that one sect did not obtain a
pre-eminent position or combine with an-
27 I ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Gaels ed. 1834).
28 Id. 758.
other to establish a religion to which they
would compel others to conform. Madison
subsequently withdrew his motion to insert
the word "national" in the amendment and
a Senate-House conference worked out the
final version as it was ultimately approved
by the states.
Madison's insistence on the federalist
character of the first amendment and the
sanctity of states' rights in relation to the
establishment clause should be sufficient to
illustrate that his position was not the same
as absolutists would have us believe. Pro-
fessor Edwin Corwin, a constitutional ex-
pert, offers the most influential and succinct
refutation of Madison's alleged absolutist
position.29 Corwin points out that the Re-
monstrance preceded the framing of the
first amendment by four years and that
Madison himself never put forth this work
as an interpretation of the amendment.
Likewise, the form of the amendment as
proposed to the state legislatures for rati-
fication was not the same as Madison had
introduced and even if it had been, the
Remonstrance indicates that "an establish-
ment of religion" meant a religion enjoying
a privileged legal position. Finally, Corwin
comments that Madison himself advocated
looking to the text of a statute in order to
determine its meaning.
The absolutists also rely to a great ex-
tent on Thomas Jefferson as a champion
of their cause. His "wall of separation"
metaphor 0 has been a rallying point for
29 Corwin, The Supreme Court as National
School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3,
13 (1949).
30 Jefferson's phrase was penned in a letter
written in 1802 to a Baptist association. It was
those who feel that all vestiges of religion
must be removed from governmental ac-
tivity. However, Jefferson's own ensuing
actions and writings tarnish the absolutist
effect which some have sought to give these
words.
Professor Robert M. Healey, a dispas-
sionate observer of Jefferson, remarks that
Jefferson admitted that religion was an
essential part of government. Jefferson
stated that "those areas of religion on which
all sects agreed were certainly to be in-
cluded within the framework of public
education."'1 Pertaining to the same con-
cept is this excerpt from Jefferson's writ-
ings:
It was not however, to be understood that
instruction in religious opinion and duties
was meant to be precluded by the public au-
thorities, as indifferent to the interests of
society. On the contrary, the relations which
exist between man and his maker, and the
duties resulting from those relations, are
the most interesting and important to every
human being and most incumbent upon his
study and investigation.3 2
While addressing himself to the question
of sectarian education at the University of
Virginia, a state institution which he helped
found, Jefferson stated that "[i]t is sup-
posed probable, that a building of some-
what more size in the middle of the grounds
may be called for in time, in which may be
adopted by the Court in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), and declared to
be an authoritative declaration of the meaning
of the first amendment.
31 HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION 208, 252 (1962).
32 S. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 957
(1943).
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rooms for religious worship .... ,,3 He
also prepared the regulations which were
ultimately adopted by the University and
included the following stipulation:
[S]hould the religious sects of this State, or
any of them, according to the invitation
held out to them, establish within, or adja-
cent to, the precincts of the University,
schools for instruction in the religion of
their sect, the students of the University
will be free, and expected to attend religious
worship at the establishment of their respec-
tive sects . . .3
It is conceded that any diligent effort to
interpret the religion clauses of the first
amendment through history is a precarious
process.3 5 However, even from this cursory
discussion of Madison's and Jefferson's
statements and actions, one does not have
to be extremely perspicacious to discern
that the two alleged stalwarts of absolutism
were not extremists at all but rather advo-
cates of a limited sphere of interaction be-
tween government and religion.
If the debate over the meaning of the
religion clauses of the first amendment is
33 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449
(Mem. ed. 1904).
34 Id. 449.
35 The Founding Fathers were novices in the
field of religious freedom, for they had come
from a background of bigotry and lived in an
era of intolerance . . . it would be strange
comment on the flexibility of our democratic
government, if after 150 years of growth our
concepts of freedom were limited to the nar-
row horizons of our forefathers. The First
Amendment, if it is to keep step with the
times, must give much wider protection than
it did in 1789.
Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious
Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REV. 53 (1946).
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vociferous, so also is the controversy sur-
rounding the applicability of the first amend-
ment to the states .3 6 In some cases the
Court has held that the fourteenth amend-
ment incorporates only those provisions of
the Bill of Rights which are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty. '37 There
are no stipulations in the fourteenth amend-
ment which allow one to substitute the
word "state" for "Congress" in the prohibi-
tions enforced by the first amendment on
laws "respecting an establishment of reli-
gion. ' '38 The limitations of the fourteenth
amendment are primarily concerned with
protecting religious liberty. Provided states
guarantee this liberty, it is within their dis-
cretion to establish religion. The fourteenth
amendment safeguards one basic right-
liberty. Justice Story expressed a similar
view in one of his commentaries on the
Constitution:
Probably at the time of the adoption of the
constitution, and of the first amendment to
it . . . . the general, if not universal senti-
ment was, that Christianity ought to receive
encouragement from the state, so far as it
was not incompatible with the private rights
of conscience, and the freedom of religious
worship. An attempt to level all religious,
and to make it a matter of state policy to
36 See Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q.
371, where it is suggested that the framers of the
amendment meant it to apply only to Congress.
37 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947);
see also Fauman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
mnent Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L.
REV. 5 (1949).
38 See Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the
Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 939 (1951),
where it states that the fourteenth amendment
was not understood as incorporating the "estab-
lishment of religions" clause.
hold all in utter indifference, would have
created universal disapprobation, if not
universal indignation. 39
All the foregoing facts lend credence to
the idea of a limited scope of the first
amendment, i.e., that "the whole power
over the subject of religion is left exclu-
sively to the state governments, to be acted
upon according to their own sense of jus-
tice, and the state constitutions .... -40
One seriously questions the soundness of
the Supreme Court's rejection of the con-
tention that the purpose of the first amend-
ment was merely to prevent a governmental
preference of one religion and that equality
of treatment for all religions is forbidden.
State Aid and the Court
Although there has been a proliferation
of literature devoted to the religion clauses,
there is a paucity of Supreme Court prec-
edent concerning them. Basically, this
scarcity can be attributed to the fact that
it was only in 1940 that the Court read the
fourteenth amendment as embodying the
pertinent provisions of the first amend-
ment.4 Another contributing factor was
that judicial review of expenditures for fed-
eral educational programs at the instance
of a federal taxpayer was unavailable from
192342 until very recently.4 3
For an interpretation of the establish-
ment clause as it pertained to state aid to
39 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874 (1833).
40 Id. § 1879.
41 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
42 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
43 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
parochial schools, one has to look back
only as far as 1947, to Everson v. Board
of Education.44 Before examining Everson,
however, one should examine those cases
which preceded it in order to obtain an
insight into what the judges used as author-
ity for their reasoning in that landmark
decision.
An investigation of pre-Everson cases
must begin with Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters.45 This was a suit by the Roman Cath-
olic Society of Sisters for an injunction
against the enforcement of an Oregon stat-
ute requiring that children aged eight to
sixteen years attend public schools. The
main issue was whether the state has a
monopoly over education. On a fourteenth
amendment property theory, the Court
held the Oregon compulsory school law
was unconstitutional as interfering with the
prerogative of parents to direct the educa-
tion of their children.46 The Court did not
dispute Oregon's power to compel school
attendance or demand that the attendance
be at an institution adhering to state im-
posed requirements as to the quality of
education. Pierce held that the state's in-
terest in education would be adequately
provided for by the secular teaching that
accompanied the religious training. By es-
44 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
45 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
46 The fundamental theory of liberty upon which
all governments in this Union repose excludes
any general power of the State to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruc-
tion from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nur-
ture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 535.
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tablishing that parents have a right to send
their children to parochial schools, Pierce
gave to the private and sectarian schools
a juridical existence and the force of the
truancy laws of the nation, greatly enhanc-
ing the status of Catholic and religious
schools.
Another important case was Meyer v.
Nebraska,47 which concerned the question
of whether the state has absolute power to
prescribe the curriculum of schools. The
Court held that a teacher in a Lutheran
parochial school who had taught the sub-
ject of reading in German could not consti-
tutionally be prosecuted under a Nebraska
statute forbidding the subject matter to be
taught in any language other than English.
The Court stated that the right to teach
was included among the "liberties" guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment against
state interference. Attacking the doctrine
that all educational rights are within the
province of the state, the Court also said
"the right of parents to engage him [the
teacher] so to instruct their children" 48 was
also one of the "liberties" protected by the
fourteenth amendment.
Although both Meyer and Pierce in-
volved church-related schools, one must
realize that the results would have been
identical had private nonsectarian institu-
tions been the issue. Both decisions repre-
sent constitutional obstructions against the
imposition by the state of an exclusive
educational pattern. The state was created
to protect the rights of its citizens, not to
subvert them. Certainly to coerce the
47 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
'IS Id. at 400.
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American public into accepting one edu-
cational system would be an infringement
of these rights.
In Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of
Education,49 a unanimous Court upheld a
Louisiana statute furnishing free textbooks
to all pupils, ih parochial and public schools
alike. Avoiding the issue of the separation
of church and state, the only argument of-
fered by the plaintiff was a plea that the
fourteenth amendment protected against
the taking of public property for private
use. The Supreme Court found that there
is a "public" purpose in education whether
given in a public or parochial school. In
order to establish the public purpose of the
textbook legislation, Chief Justice Hughes
quoted at length from the sections of the
Louisiana majority opinion where the dis-
tinction between aid to the child and aid
to the school were explained. The pertinent
excerpt stated:
The schools, however, are not the bene-
ficiaries of these appropriations. . . . The
school children and the state alone are
beneficiaries. It is also true that the sec-
tarian schools, which some of the children
attend, instruct their pupils in religion, and
books are used for that purpose, but one
may search diligently the acts, though with-
out result, in an effort to find anything to
the effect that it is the purpose of the state
to furnish religious books for the use of
such children.50
This was interpreted as the birth of the
"child benefit" theory. 51 Cochran clearly
49 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
50 Id. at 375.
51 This is the theory that legislation primarily
provides some secular benefit for the child, an
establishes that the teaching of secular sub-
jects in a parochial school is the perfor-
mance of a public function and that such
program may be aided by government.
In light of this background, the Court
handed down its decision in Everson and
initially applied the establishment clause
of the first amendment to the states. The
Court upheld state reimbursement of bus
fares for school children irrespective of the
schools they attended. Writing for the ma-
jority, Mr. Justice Black concluded that
the New Jersey legislature did "no more
than provide a general program to help
parents get their children, regardless of
their religion, safely and expeditiously to
and from accredited schools"5 2 and thus
thereby was only extending its general pub-
lic benefits to all its citizens. The Court
recognized that this aid helped children
to get to church schools and that some
might not even attend if parents were com-
pelled to pay for bus fares out of their own
pockets when transportation to a public
school would have been paid by the state.
Despite the unanimous agreement of the
justices that the establishment clause pro-
hibited government aid to religion, the
overwhelming public welfare aspect of the
program prevailed.
Much attention has focused on Mr. Jus-
tice Black's famous no-aid dictum:
The "establishment of religion" clause of
the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass
incidental benefit to religious education does not
make the law unconstitutional.
52 330 U.S. at 18.
laws which aid one religion, aid all re-
ligions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No per-
son can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can
be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. 5,3
Any analysis of these words must take into
consideration that they were meant to con-
strue only the establishment clause. As
the Court apprehended, the demands of
the free exercise clause acted as a qualify-
ing factor to this strict interpretation of the
establishment clause. The free exercise
clause
commands that New Jersey cannot hamper
its citizens in the free exercise of their own
religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Moham-
medans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-
believers, Presbyterians, or the members
of any other faith, because of their faith,
or lack of it, from receiving the benefits
of public welfare legislation. 54
The limited scope of Black's statement is
best illustrated by the fact that he upheld
the statute. Had Black followed his strict
definition of what the establishment clause
means, he would have reached a different
result, because it seems to preclude any
type of aid to private and parochial schools.
53 Id. at 15-16.
54 Id. at 16.
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In the Court's view, bus transportation
was sufficiently removed from the educa-
tional process to warrant its constitution-
ality. Although noting that the decision
approached the "verge of . . . power," 55
the Court reasserted the "child benefit"
theory of Cochran. The "verge of . . .
power" phrase raised many questions as to
whether more direct aid to education would
be prohibited. The Court's decision in Ever-
son did not seem to provide an adequate
insight into the establishment clause. 56
Rather the opinion tended to obscure the
standards a statute had to follow in order
to be constitutional.
After Everson, the Court in a prepon-
derance of cases adopted a strict view of
what is legally permissible in public schools
in regards to the restriction of religious
clauses.5 7 During this period, the Court
55 Id.
56 It is conceivable that if the Court decided the
Everson case today it might have a different re-
sult. Consider this statement of Justice Douglas:
My problem today would be uncomplicated
but for Everson v. Board of Education . . .
the Everson case seems in retrospect to be out
of line with the First Amendment. Its result is
appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy
children. Yet by the same token, public funds
could be used to satisfy other needs of children
in parochial schools-lunches, books, and tui-
tion being obvious examples. Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge stated in dissent what I think is durable
First Amendment philosophy ...
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962).
57 See, e.g., McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (a "released time" program in
which public school classrooms were used for
religious instruction was held unconstitutional on
the ground that it used the tax supported system
to aid religious groups in spreading their faith);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), (state di-
rective requiring an official prayer to be said
aloud in public school classes is contrary to the
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used a variety of tests in evaluating the
validity of state legislation under the estab-
lishment clause. 58 With the emphasis on
the encroachment of religion in the schools,
the cases in this period were not directly
concerned with the question of state aid
to parochial schools.
Twenty years elapsed after Everson be-
fore the Court once again confronted the
issue of state aid to parochial schools.
Board of Education v. Allen59 held that a
New York statute providing for a loan of
secular textbooks to parochial school stu-
dents did not violate the establishment
clause in that the law had "a secular leg-
islative purpose and primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion." 60
The Court stated that the statute merely
made available to all children the benefits
of a general program to lend schoolbooks
free of charge. Being a general welfare
program, the New York statute was anal-
ogous to the one upheld in Everson.
The statute provided that books were to
be furnished at the request of the pupil, but
ownership would remain, at least techni-
establishment clause); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading
and recitation by public school children as part
of the curricular activities of students is uncon-
stitutional). But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1951) (a statute was held constitutional
which merely permitted public schools to release
students during the school day to go to religious
centers for instruction on a voluntary basis).
5s See cases cited in note 57.
59 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
G0 The secular purpose and primary effect test
was first clarified by the Court in a decision which
struck down the practice of bible reading in pub-
lic schools as violative of the establishment clause
of the first amendment. Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
cally, in the state. No funds or books could
be furnished to parochial schools, there-
fore the financial benefit would run to the
parents and children, not to the schools.
Furthermore, only secular books could re-
ceive approval for loans. The majority rec-
ognized the difference between the books
involved here and the buses in Everson but
believed that sufficient safeguards were
taken to prevent the loan of religious text-
books. Allen can be seen as an extension of
the Everson case, because it provided aid
for activities directly connected to the edu-
cational process.
From the few facts available, the Court
conceded that the secular could be dis-
tinguished from the religious in the edu-
cational systems of nonpublic schools.
However, if the Court had discovered that
the secular classes in a parochial school
were permeated by religious teaching, the
statute undoubtedly would have been found
in conflict with the first amendment.
As to the test employed by this Court
-that of "secular purpose and primary
effect"" 1-the statute was found in accor-
dance. The purpose of the statute as ex-
pressed by the New York legislature was
the furtherance of the educational oppor-
tunities available to all youth. This was
sufficient to meet the "secular purpose"
requirement of the test. However, more
01 The broad application that can be given to
the "secular purpose" test is its outstanding de-
ficiency. "It is doubtful that there is a legislature
in the land so tongue-tied that it could not find
a multitude of secular purposes to cover any
religious interest it wished to accommodate." La
Noue, The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Text-
books, Transportation and Medical Care 13 J.
PUB. L. 76, 77-78 (1964).
difficulty was involved in evaluating the
"primary effect" of the statute. While the
statute financially aided parents and chil-
dren, the Court conceded that it indirectly
aided parochial schools because free books
might make attendance at these schools
more conducive to some students. As in
Everson, the Court decided that these in-
direct benefits to the schools were not
enough to find the statute unconstitutional.
The recent case of Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,6 2 decided along with Robinson v.
DiCenso,63 represents the initial excursion
of the Burger Court into the realm of state
aid to parochial schools. The question in
both Lemon and Robinson concerned the
constitutionality of state statutes providing
state aid to church related elementary and
secondary schools, and to teachers therein,
with regard to instruction in secular mat-
ters.
In Lemon, the Pennsylvania statute64
in issue provided for state reimbursement
of nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools. The reimbursement was for the
cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials in specified secular
subjects which did not contain any subject
matter expressing a religious teaching or
the morals or forms of worship of any sect.
The participating schools were required to
maintain, subject to state audit, prescribed
accounting procedures to identify the cost
of the secular educational service. Further
specifications of the statute provided that
the textbooks and instructional materials
62 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
63 Id.
64 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp.
1970).
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were subject to approval by the state and
that reimbursement was limited to courses
presented in the public schools.
In the Robinson case, a statute65 provid-
ing for payment of up to 15 percent annual
salary supplements to teachers of secular
subjects in nonpublic elementary schools
was challenged. Under the statute, the
teacher was required to be employed in a
nonpublic school at which the average per-
pupil expenditure on secular education was
less than the public school average. If any
questions arose as to the amount of ex-
penditure, the school's financial records
were subject to audit by the state. The
teachers were required to teach only those
subjects offered in the public schools, em-
ploying teaching materials used in public
schools. Another prerequisite for the salary
supplement required the teachers to agree
in writing not to teach a course in religion
while receiving salary supplements. Only
teachers in parochial schools had applied
for benefits under the statute.
Chief Justice Burger held that the stat-
utes in both Lemon and Robinson were un-
constitutional under the religion clauses of
the first amendment because "the cumula-
tive impact of the entire relationship aris-
ing under the statutes in each State involves
excessive entanglement between Govern-
ment and religion." 66 Admitting the diffi-
culty of adjudicating state aid cases, the
Court stated that "[clandor compels ac-
knowledgment . . . that we can only
perceive the lines of demarcation in this
65 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 16-51-1 et seq.
(Supp. 1970).
66 403 U.S. at 614.
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extraordinary sensitive area of constitu-
tional law." 67
The Court enumerated three tests in de-
termining whether a statute fulfilled the
constitutional mandate as being "no law
respecting an establishment of religion."
The first two standards were the "secular
purpose and primary effect" previously
mentioned in respect to the Allen case.
Relying solely on the third test, excessive
entanglement, the Court disregarded the
other tests.
To see exactly what comprises "entan-
glement" as established by the Court, a
number of ingredients have to be examined
in each case. The character and purposes
of the institutions which are benefitted must
be inspected as well as the nature of the
aid that the state provides. Finally, the
resulting relationships between the govern-
ment and the religious authorities is ex-
tremely important.
Besides looking at the religious purpose
and operation of the Church-related ele-
mentary and secondary schools involved,
the Court also took into consideration the
enhancement of religious indoctrination re-
sulting from the impressionable age of the
pupils, particularly in elementary schools.
The Court also considered the necessity of
state surveillance to insure that the teach-
ers observed the restrictions as to purely
secular instruction. Also influencing the
Court in determining this "entanglement"
was the states' right to examine the paro-
chial schools' financial records to determine
which expenditures were religious and
67 Id. at 612.
which were secular. Lastly, the probable
intensification of political divisiveness along
religious lines resulting from the annual
appropriations required under the statutes
was also a key factor cited by the Court.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Doug-
las expressed a few additional views. He
found that the secular instruction in paro-
chial schools was an integral part of the
religious instruction. Furthermore, Doug-
las stressed the idea that what the taxpayers
gave for secular purposes under the state
statutes would enable the parochial schools
to use all of their own funds for religious
training.
Justice Brennan, also concurring, saw a
real danger of secularization of a creed
through the states' regulation and policing of
the instruction and teachers of the sectarian
schools. Positing that the objectionable
features of the statutes as to surveillance
were removed, Brennan indicated that the
aid would still be unconstitutional, even
though relegated solely to secular educa-
tion.
It can be argued that the Lemon deci-
sion is deficient in various areas. The Court
presented a somewhat obsolete picture of
the Catholic educational system. Here the
Court engaged in conjectures concerning
the stereotyped characterizations of church-
related schools, which it had refused to do
in Allen. As Mr. Roman Pucinski, chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Gen-
eral Education, stated:
... if the Supreme Court Justices had any
knowledge at all about the operations of
this [n]ation's parochial schools, they would
know that the religious administrators of
those schools frequently carefully instruct
lay teachers to refrain from religious teach-
ing, because the spiritual leaders of these
schools believe this is their responsibility
and do not want lay teachers teaching re-
ligion. This is a subject they quite properly
reserve primarily for themselves, since they
have been specially trained to teach re-
ligion. 68
The inference that secular teaching in to-
day's parochial schools is permeated with
religious ideals or that teachers cannot
separate the two is perhaps unrealistic. 69
The Court also refused to admit that
there was any variation between Catholic
schools. Although the decision in Lemon
was limited only to the specified defendant
schools,70 the Court placed all schools un-
der the same sweeping constitutional ban,
without affording them the opportunity to
demonstrate that their relationship and op-
erations in connection with the Pennsyl-
vania statute do not involve the unconsti-
tutional relationships described by the
Court's decision.
It is suggested that the Court should
have relied on the revealed facts rather
than stressing the "potential" for abuse in-
herent in the appropriate statute. Chief
68 117 CONG. REC. H. 5970 (daily ed. June 28,
1971).
69 Appellants voluntarily abandoned their class
action below and the Court below excluded the
class action allegations from the case. See Peti-
tion of Appellees for Rehearing and Supplemental
Opinion, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
70 Plaintiffs failed to provide any facts which
would disprove the legislative acceptance of sec-
ular educational programs in church-related
schools as fulfilling the compulsory education
laws. Thus the Court should have refused to
accept the "permeation" doctrine on its face as
they refused to do in Allen. 392 U.S. at 247-48.
17 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1971
Justice Burger stated that "what has been
recounted suggests the potential if not ac-
tual hazards of this form of state aid"7' 1
and "the potential for impermissible fos-
tering of religion is present." 72 The Court
rejected "the District Court's express find-
ings that on the evidence before it none of
the teacher[']s here involved mixed reli-
gious and secular instruction. ' 73 The dis-
trict court had determined that:
this concern for religious values does not
necessarily affect the content of secular
subjects in diocesan schools. On the con-
trary, several teachers testified at trial that
they did not inject religion into their sec-
ular classes, and one teacher deposed that
he taught exactly as he had while employed
in a public school. 74
One questions the Court's utilization of
the "entanglement" test as an independent
standard of adjudication, divorced from
the concepts of secular legislative purpose
and primary effects of advancing or inhib-
iting religion. In Walz v. Tax Commis-
sion,7 5 the Court spoke of "involvement"
and "entanglement" by way of dictum.
The Court's whole discussion of "entangle-
ment" in Walz centers upon whether the
actions involved have a primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion and upon
nothing else. Otherwise, as an independent
test it would constitutionalize a state pro-
viding aid without any restrictions to
schools of only one denomination; this
71 403 U.S. at 618.
72 Id. at 619.
73 Id. at 666 (White, J., dissenting).
74 DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 117
(D.R.I. 1970).
75 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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would clearly violate the fundamental pro-
hibition of the establishment clause.
The "broader base of entanglement" that
the Court envisioned by "the divisive po-
litical potential of these state programs" is
susceptible to constructive criticism. It ap-
pears that the Court is suggesting that a
statute which benefits the education of pa-
rochial school students is unconstitutional
due to the public outcries it might elicit
from opponents of the aid. Although the
Court does not explicitly forbid churches
to express their views on issues of public
concern, it seems to be limiting the perog-
ative of their members to speak out polit-
ically on issues which directly affect their
personal interests. Following this line of
reasoning, the disturbing situation may de-
velop where any attempt by religious groups
to obtain legislation which might parallel
their religious beliefs could be declared
void, e.g., abortion and birth control. The
question arises as to whether political ac-
tivity would continue to be permissible in
areas common to all, or most, religious
groups, such as tax exemption or health,
but be impermissible where tenets of a sin-
gle denomination were concerned. It has
been suggested that "[i]f they [the Court]
mean what they say [in Lemon and Di-
Censo] they are engaged in the greatest
attempt to gag the churches in the history
of American law.''76 Churches have always
been in the center of American politics
and have enjoyed freedom of expression on
critical public issues such as the future of
American education.
76 Whelan, Lessons from the School Aid Deci-
sions, AMERICA, July 24, 1971, at 32 [hereinafter
Whelan].
The Court has now placed the state leg-
islatures in a very difficult position. While
the Court repudiates any direct aid to sec-
tarian schools, it equally denounces all
statutory and administrative attempts to
prevent such abuses as impermissible "en-
tanglement," thus creating an impossible
dilemma for the legislator. As Justice
White commented:
The State cannot finance secular instruc-
tions if it permits religion to be taught in
the same classroom; but if it exacts a prom-
ise that religion not be so taught-a prom-
ise the school and its teachers are quite
willing and on this record able to give-and
enforces it, it is then entangled in the "no
entanglement" aspect of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 77
Thus, even though the legislative pur-
pose of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes was intended solely to enhance the
quality of secular education in all schools
covered by compulsory attendance laws,
they were found unconstitutional.
The Court recognized the role of church-
related schools in American education and
observed that "[t]heir contribution has been
and is enormous. Nor do we ignore their
economic plight in a period of rising costs
and expanding need." s78 Yet "perhaps the
biggest disappointment in the court's rea-
soning was the failure of all the justices
save one (White) to recognize the critical
role that nonpublic schools play in Amer-
ica education."7 9 The Court seems to indi-
cate that these schools are significant only
77 403 U.S. at 668 (White, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 625.
79 See Whelan, supra note 76.
to the churches that sponsor, finance, and
operate them. Given the present fiscal and
social crises in American education, it is
obvious that these schools render a public
service and their continuance is important
to the country. If the Court had acknowl-
edged that these schools are simply con-
duits which the state employs for the general
welfare of all its citizens, the result might
have been different. Public schools receive
their allocations for public functions; thus
the public functions of church-related
schools would seem to justify partial gov-
ernment support.
Constitutionality of State Aid
As previously stated, the extremist po-
sitions concerning state aid to parochial
schools are totally erroneous. Aid to pa-
rochial schools is constitutional, as long
as the aid is not used for a religious func-
tion. Examination of supporting criteria
for this statement is therefore appropriate.
The religion clauses of the first amend-
ment have to be thoroughly examined
when considering state aid to parochial
schools. The question arises as to whether
the two clauses express a dichotomy of
ideas or state as the primary limitations of
the first amendment a unitary principle of
separation of church and state. The more
plausible explanation seems to be that sep-
aration is required only to the extent that
it is necessary to prevent establishment
and assure free exercise of religion. In
emphasizing that the government must re-
main neutral in respect to religious mat-
ters, Professor Wilber Katz advances the
similar argument that this neutrality is de-
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signed to guarantee religious liberty.8
0
Justice Douglas also subscribed to this view
in his Zorach opinion.81 The strict separa-
tion of church and state called for by the
establishment clause is alleviated by the
free exercise clause, the result being that
legislation normally precluded by strict
church-state separation is permissible to
avoid hampering the free exercise clause.
In many situations complete separation
of church and state would operate to re-
strain religious freedom. Limits of the
separation doctrine are to be found by
reference to the constitutional principle of
religious liberty. For example, in the armed
forces or in federal prison, absolute separa-
tion of church and state would invalidate
regulations facilitating religious worship.
Dissenting in McCollum v. Board of Edu-
cation,82 Justice Reed cited a convincing
number of instances in which our political
and educational activities are permeated
with religious practices.88 It appears that
the free exercise clause must predominate
over the establishment clause when the two
come in direct and irreconcilable conflict.
The Supreme Court has always prudently
guarded the religious freedom even in triv-
ial cases.8 4
80 Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neu-
trality, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 426 (1953).
81 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
82 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
83 Id. at 253-55.
84 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (state may not deny unemployment com-
pensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist
who, for religious reasons, could not satisfy the
statutory requirements that she be able and will-
ing to work on Saturday, her sabbath); Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) ("religious test
for public office" violates applicant's freedom of
belief and religion).
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State aid to parochial schools is neces-
sary to guard people's free exercise of
religion. To refuse aid to church-related
schools, given their current financial prob-
lems, would be akin to enacting a law that
all children must attend public schools, and
this has already been declared constitution-
ally impermissible by the Supreme Court.
The government should not be permitted
to issue directives to parents concerning
the schools in which their children should
be educated. It is inherently discriminatory
to give financial aid to one group of parents
for the education of their children in public
schools and deny it to another group whose
children attend church-related schools. The
argument for the constitutionality of aid
for the non-religious functions of church-
related schools is augmented by the Court's
decision in Allen. While lucidly denying
aid to religion, the Court also tenaciously
held that the enormous power of the gov-
ernment may not discourage or "inhibit"
religion.
The functions of the schools must also
be considered when determining the per-
missibility of aid. The basic premise on
which aid to public schools is founded is
the public service it provides through sec-
ular education. Proponents of aid 85 allude
to the fact that religious schools adhere to
85 One wonders what adverse affect it has on the
proponents to be described as follows:
The same powerful sectarian religion propa-
gandists who have succeeded in securing pas-
sage of the present law to help religious schools
carry on their sectarian religious purposes can
and doubtless will continue their propaganda,
looking toward complete domination and su-
premacy of their particular brand of religion.
Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (Black,
J., dissenting).
the education standards exacted by the
states and also alleviate the state's burden
of educating large numbers of children.
When the state refuses to pay for the sec-
ular education of parochial school children,
it is apparently withholding its help merely
on the basis of religion. Since Catholic
schools stress the student's role as a citizen,
religious aspects in church-related schooling
are a supplement to secular education.
Parochial schools are in a position where
they either perform the same functions as
public schools in training children or they
do not. If they do, they deserve public sup-
port as compensation for the contribution
they bestow upon the state.
It has already been illustrated in dis-
cussing the Lemon case that there is a con-
stitutional presumption that all education
in church-related schools amounts to sec-
tarian education. This hypothesis has been
rejected by numerous state legislatures and
by Congress.8 6 If the secular aspects of
church-related education were totally in-
filtrated with religion as some have advised,
the Constitution should exempt it from all
state regulatory burdens, for the govern-
ment cannot regulate the internal affairs
of churches.
The theory of neutrality requires govern-
ment impartiality between religious sects
and between believers and non-believers. 87
86 See notes 15-20 supra.
87 That [First] Amendment requires the state to
be a neutral in its relations with groups of
religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary. State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions than it is to favor them.
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. at 18; accord,
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
This neutrality would appear to be violated
by the continuous exclusion of any refer-
ence to religion in public schools. Main-
taining the secular character of public
schools without establishing secularism is
a grave problem. Contemporary public
schools emphasize only the secular aspects
of life and exclude the spiritual and reli-
gious aspects of our culture, thereby pre-
senting a total distortion of the reality
of life. This trend is definitely an abandon-
ment of the neutrality principle and in fact
leads to establishment of a religion of sec-
ularism. In the Allen case, Mr. Justice
Douglas advances this concept by portray-
ing the public school not as a neutral or
impartial institution but rather the epitome
of secularism. 8s
Another point to be stressed is that all
education cannot be kept truly religion-
free, because "[t]he task of separating the
secular from the religious in education is
one of magnitude, intricacy and delicacy."89
As was cogently expressed in McCollum
this separation is impractical:
But it would not seem practical to teach
either practice or appreciation of the arts
if we are to forbid exposure of youth to
any religious influences. Music without
sacred music, architecture minus the cathe-
dral, or painting without the scriptural
themes would be eccentric and incomplete,
even from a secular point of view. ...
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly
everything in our culture worth transmit-
ting, everything which gives meaning to
life, is saturated with religious influences,
derived from paganism, Judaism, Chris-
88 392 U.S. at 254 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
237 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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tianity-both Catholic and Protestant-and
other faiths accepted by a large part of the
world's peoples.9 0
It would seem reasonable that if public
education in state-run schools can minimize
to a tolerable constitutional level the reli-
gious aspect of its secular instruction, then
it would also be feasible for public edu-
cation in church-related schools to main-




It has been illustrated that state aid to
parochial schools is indeed constitutional
when limited to nonreligious functions. In
several aspects, the Lemon case appears to
be at variance with historical precedents
and rationales. Government involvement
with church-affiliated schools, health facil-
ities, and welfare institutions has always
been greater than that present in aid to
education statutes. 2 Governmental regula-
tion of the secular aspects of education in
nonpublic schools under compulsory edu-
cation laws has never been challenged as
involving "entanglement." The term "exces-
sive entanglement" will undoubtedly be
tested in numerous cases in the years ahead
91) Id. at 235-36 (Jackson, J., concurring).
91 Another plausible argument for aid is that it
is necessary to keep the nonpublic schools open
in order to foster competition between school
systems thus increasing the quality of American
education. See, e.g., O'Neill, Giving Americans a
Choice-Alternatives to Public Education, AMER-
ICA, Jan. 24, 1970, at 66.
92 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 241, 821-88 (Supp. V,
1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 10-281 (Supp.
1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-23-2 (1969).
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in order to clarify its relationship to pri-
mary purpose and secular effect.
Delineating permissible from impermis-
sible in the sphere of aid to parochial
schools is extremely difficult. Perhaps a
better solution would be to leave the prob-
lems in this area to the legislator rather
than the jurist. Indeed, state aid to paro-
chial schools may be a question which is
better left to nonjudicial determination.
Today, most of the crucial questions in
constitutional law possess social as well as
legal ramifications.
Rather than a realistic assessment of the
situation in today's society, the separation
of church and state is more of an ideal.
